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Introduction 
The financial crisis has dramatically demonstrated 
how a collapse in equity prices can decimate retire-
ment accounts.  The crisis highlights the fragility of 
existing 401(k) plans as the only supplement to Social 
Security and has sparked proposals to reform the 
retirement income system.  One component of such 
a system could be a new tier of retirement accounts.  
Given the declines in the share of earnings Social 
Security will replace, these accounts would bolster 
replacement rates for low-wage workers and increase 
the security of middle- and upper-wage workers who 
increasingly rely on their 401(k) plans to supplement 
Social Security.  However, these new accounts could 
face the same risk of collapse in value seen over the 
past year in 401(k)s.  So policymakers may find some 
form of guaranteed return or risk sharing desirable 
to prevent huge variations in outcomes.1  This brief 
explores the feasible range and the cost of the first 
option – guarantees.  
This brief is structured as follows.  The first section 
reviews the argument for more retirement saving and 
shows the inevitable volatility that results from leav-
ing the outcomes completely up to the market.  The 
second section shows that, in retrospect, it would have 
been quite cheap to have guaranteed relatively high 
real rates of return on individual account balances 
and that only high guarantees would have smoothed 
returns across cohorts in a meaningful way.  The 
third section uses finance theory to price guarantees 
prospectively, finding that guarantees in excess of the 
risk-free rate are not possible if the guarantor shares 
the market’s aversion to risk.  The fourth section 
concludes that, as long as the guarantor shares the 
market’s aversion to risk, rate of return guarantees 
are unlikely to solve the problem of wide variations in 
outcomes due to market fluctuations.  Guaranteeing 
the riskless rate would have had no impact historical-
ly.  And finance theory suggests that insurers cannot 
guarantee returns greater than the riskless rate unless
they are willing and able to bear more risk than other 
investors. 
The Need for More Retire-
ment Income
People need more retirement saving because the 
existing retirement income system is contracting 
By Alicia H. Munnell, Alex Golub-Sass, Richard W. Kopcke, and Anthony Webb*2).4   This pattern occurs even when individuals invest 
in a target date fund.  These accumulations are only 
somewhat offset by variations in interest rates at 
retirement when individuals are assumed to use their 
accumulations to purchase a real (inflation-adjusted) 
annuity.     
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and people are living longer.  At any given retirement 
age, Social Security benefits will replace a smaller 
fraction of pre-retirement earnings than in the past.              
First, the increase in the Full Retirement Age from 
65 to 67 is equivalent to an across-the-board cut.  
Second, the taxation of Social Security benefits under 
the personal income tax will move further down the 
income distribution, as the exemption amounts in the 
tax code are not indexed to wage growth or inflation.  
Additional benefit cuts that might be enacted to shore 
up the solvency of the Social Security program would 
further lower replacement rates.
With a diminished role for Social Security, retirees 
will be increasingly dependent on employer-spon-
sored pensions.  At any moment in time, however, 
less than half of the private sector workforce age 25-
64 participates in any employer-sponsored plan.  And 
those who do have employer-sponsored coverage find 
themselves increasingly reliant on 401(k) plans.  In 
theory, workers could accumulate substantial wealth 
in a 401(k), but the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey of 
Consumer Finances reports that the typical household 
head approaching retirement (age 55-64) had 401(k)/
IRA balances of only $60,000.2  Although 401(k) 
plans received a boost from the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006, which encouraged employers to make 
their plans easier and more automatic, the basic fra-
gility of 401(k)s was exposed by the current financial 
crisis, which has reduced the value of equities in 
401(k)s/IRAs by about $2 trillion.3   
Given the decline in Social Security and employer-
provided pensions, workers could save more on their 
own.  But they have not.  Thus, many future retirees – 
both those who must rely only on Social Security and 
those who have a supplementary 401(k) plan – are 
likely to have inadequate retirement income.  Pro-
posals to expand coverage through automatic IRAs 
or a universal 401(k) implicitly claim that those who 
already have a supplementary plan will be adequately 
prepared for retirement.  As indicated above, this 
assumption is not correct.  Thus, the vast majority of 
future retirees will need an additional tier of retire-
ment saving.  Figure 1 presents a schematic of what 
an additional tier might look like.  
An earlier brief showed that replacement rates 
– benefits as a percent of pre-retirement earnings – 
produced by a defined contribution account will vary 
dramatically depending on the performance of the 
stock market during the period over which the partici-
pant is working and accumulating assets (see Figure 
Figure 1. Additional Tier of Funded, Privately-
Managed Retirement Saving
Source: Authors’ illustration.
The recent financial crisis highlights another 
problem with defined contribution accounts – namely, 
values can drop precipitously just as participants 
are approaching retirement.  Sharp drops in retire-
ment balances upset people’s plans even if the drops 
merely offset a lifetime of high returns.  Earlier high 
returns are likely to have encouraged people to cut 
back on their saving, sensing they had “enough” for 
retirement.  As a result, a market collapse leaves most 
people with inadequate retirement saving. 
Figure 2. Replacement Rate from a Real Annuity 
Based on Accumulations in a Target Date Fund
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The question is whether policymakers would view 
as acceptable such widely different replacement rates 
and the potential for large declines.  If such outcomes 
are not acceptable, mechanisms would be needed to 
address these problems in the new tier of retirement 
saving.  Interestingly, the two problems are inter-
twined, and solving one substantially ameliorates the 
other, as will be shown below.    
Guarantees in Retrospect
The most straightforward approach would be to guar-
antee rates of return.5  The following exercise esti-
mates when and how much the guarantor would have 
had to pay out to cover different levels of guarantees.  
The model assumes that workers enter the workforce 
at 22, work steadily for 43 years and retire at age 65, 
and enjoy real wage growth of 2 percent a year.  Each 
year from 1883 to 2008 workers contribute 4 per-
cent of their income to their account and invest their 
contributions in a fund of U.S. equities.  Over that 
period, the stock market returned 7.6 percent after 
inflation with a standard deviation of 19.5 percent.  In 
the analysis below, the first cohort reaches age 65 in 
1925.  
Although we are ultimately interested in replace-
ment rates rather than age 65 accumulations, to 
simplify the exercise we ignore the effect of interest 
rates on annuity prices and focus on accumulations 
at age 65.  Thus, the question becomes how often and 
how much would a guarantor have had to pay in order 
to provide workers when they reached age 65 a real 
return of 2 percent, 3 percent, 4 percent, 5 percent, or 
6 percent on their lifetime contributions.  To satisfy 
each of these guarantees, Table 1 shows the dates and 
the amounts that would have had to be transferred to 
those age 65 as a percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).  Note that the table shows only those years 
that involve a required payment.  See the Appendix 
for additional details on the calculations.   
The results reveal, based on historical data, that a 
2-percent and 3-percent guarantee would never have 
required any payments.  The reason is that, over the 
period under consideration, a portfolio fully invested 
in equities never yielded less than 3.8 percent aver-
aged over an individual’s work life.  A 4-percent guar-
antee would have required payments in three years 
out of the 84 years; a 5-percent guarantee would have 
required payments in eight years; and a 6-percent 
guarantee would have required payments in 27 out of 
the 84 years.  For example, with a 6-percent guaran-
tee, the guarantor would have had to pay out to those 
turning 65 in 2008 an amount equal to 0.42 percent 
of GDP, about $60 billion. 
Table 1. Required Guarantee Payment as a 
Percent of GDP by Guaranteed Rate of Return
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2008); Officer and Williamson (2008); 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey 
(CPS) (1962-2008); and U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial 
Census (1920-1960).
Year
   Guaranteed Rate of Return
2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
1925 - -  -   - 0.59%
1926 - - - 0.52%
1931 - - 0.06% 0.82% 1.85%
1932 - - 0.17% 1.19% 2.55%
1933 - - - - 1.04%
1934 - - - 0.05% 1.39%
1937 - - - - 1.01%
1939 - - - - 0.21%
1940 - - - - 0.51%
1941 - - 0.01% 0.32% 0.74%
1942 - - - 0.23%  0.61%
1943 - - - 0.04%  0.38%
1944 - - - - 0.25%
1946 - - - - 0.31%
1947 - - - 0.05% 0.39%
1948 - - - 0.07% 0.41%
1949 - - - - 0.28%
1974 - - - - 0.36%
1977 - - - - 0.10%
1978 - - - - 0.28%
1979 - - - - 0.28%
1980 - - - - 0.07%
1981 - - - - 0.40%
1982 - - - - 0.26%
1983 - - - - 0.06%
1984 - - - -  0.14%
2008 - - - - 0.42%Center for Retirement Research 4
Two key questions regarding guarantees in 
retrospect are how much they would have cost and 
whether they would have done the job of smooth-
ing replacement rates and avoiding major upset to 
people’s plans.  The following discussion assumes 
that the guarantor is the government.6  Relying on 
the private sector for even low levels of guarantees 
raises issues relating to the continuity of the insurer 
and the availability of a natural hedge.  Given the 
recent demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers and the plight of AIG, individuals would have no 
confidence that the firm offering the guarantee would 
be there for the payoff forty years down the road.  And 
private sector firms would have no natural hedge to 
insure against the possibility of having to cover the 
guarantee, since very few counterparties exist that 
would gain from a sharp economic downturn.  Thus, 
the government becomes the only realistic source 
of guarantees and the questions are whether the 
government in retrospect could have afforded the cost 
of guarantees and whether guarentees would have 
smoothed fluctuations.  
Cost of Guarantees in Retrospect
The cost depends on what happens to returns in 
excess of the government guarantee.  That is, assume 
the government guarantees a 4-percent return, but 
those turning 65 in a given year had earned 8 percent
 over their worklives.  The additional 4 percent could 
accrue to the individuals – that is, they get the upside 
– or it could go to the government to offset future bad 
years.  Over the past 84-year period, if the govern-
ment had gotten the whole upside, it would have 
experienced no net cost – even at a guarantee level of 
6 percent.  In fact, the government would have made 
money (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Cost of Government Guarantees as a 
Percent of GDP, Depending on Entity Keeping 
the Upside, 1925-2008
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2008); Officer and Williamson (2008); 
1962-2008 CPS; and 1920-1960 Decennial Census.
On the other hand, if individuals had kept the 
whole upside, the government would have faced some 
costs (see Table 2).  The government could have is-
sued debt when the payments were made and spread 
the costs over, say, the next 30 years.  On average, the 
government would have needed to raise taxes by an 
amount equal to 0.18 percent of GDP (roughly $26 
billion in 2008).  Alternatively, the costs could have 
been covered by increasing the individual contribu-
tion rate.  For example, to guarantee each individual 
retiring at age 65 an annual average rate of return of 
6 percent, the contribution rate would have had to be 
raised from 4 percent to 4.36 percent.  The basic con-
clusion is that regardless of how costs are measured, 
guarantees – even high levels of guarantees – would 
have been totally affordable in retrospect. 
Effect of Guarantees in Retrospect
The impetus for the discussion of guarantees was 
twofold.  First, policymakers might not want a 
government-sponsored tier of retirement income to 
have replacement rates varying from 20 percent to 50 
percent.  Second, it might be desirable to avoid a sys-
tem where participants can see their account balances 
drop by 30 percent as they approach retirement.  The 
question is the extent to which guarantees solve these 
problems.  
Smoothing replacement rates.  Providing low levels 
of guarantees – say 2 or 3 percent – and allowing 
individuals to keep the upside, does virtually nothing 
to eliminate the fluctuations.  As discussed above, no 
group turning 65 in the last 84 years would have seen 
a lifetime return of less than 3.8 percent.  Therefore, 
the guarantee would never have been paid, and the 
pattern of accumulations relative to final earnings 
would have been identical to that produced by the 
fluctuations in the market (see Figure 3 on the next 
page).  On the other hand, a guarantee of, say, 6 
percent, with the upside going to the government, 
stabilizes accumulations relative to final earnings by 
providing everyone with the same amount. 
The stability in accumulations relative to earn-
ings appears to be purchased at the expense of some 
groups of retirees foregoing substantial gains.  This 
outcome is the result of picking a guarantee of 6 per-
cent when equities have yielded 7.6 percent.  A higher 
guarantee would eliminate the apparent problem, but 
would put future taxpayers on the hook for bigger 
payments.  But it is worth noting that even a guaran-
tee of 6 percent allows individuals to invest all their 
Entity keeping the upside
Government Individuals
3 percent     -2.194%    0.000%
4 percent -1.864 0.003
5 percent -1.424 0.033
6 percent -0.834 0.183
Guaranteed
rate of returnYear Guarantee Market
2007   $188,000 $259,600
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contributions in the new tier in equities.  Without 
a guarantee, most financial experts would advise 
individuals to invest in a suitable target date fund 
where the percent in equities declines as the person 
ages.  Such an approach would produce not only wide 
variations in accumulations, as discussed earlier, but 
also lower accumulations than a 6-percent return (see 
Figure 4).
 
Avoiding sharp drops.  As in the case of smoothing, a 
guarantee of 2 or 3 percent would have had no effect, 
while a guarantee of 6 percent would have avoided a 
major calamity in 2008.  Figure 5 shows the accumu-
lated balances in a defined contribution account for 
a hypothetical individual entering the labor force in 
1966 at age 22 and turning 65 in 2008 under a 6-
percent guarantee and under market returns.7   Under 
a 6-percent guarantee, where the government gets the 
Figure 3. Ratio of Assets to Final Salary, 
Assuming a 3-Percent Guarantee with Upside and 
a 6-Percent Guarantee with No Upside
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); and 
Burtless (2008).
Figure 4. Ratio of Assets to Final Salary, 
Assuming a 6-Percent Guarantee with No Upside 
and a Target Date Fund
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); 
Burtless (2008); and Fidelity Investments (2008).
upside, the individual would have been entitled to 
$188,000 in 2007, while the market value of assets 
in the account would have been $259,600.  In 2008, 
the financial collapse would have reduced the market 
value of assets by 35 percent to $169,600.  But, with 
the guarantee of a cumulative lifetime return of 6 
percent, the government would have transferred 
$31,500 to the individual’s guaranteed account.  This 
transfer would have brought the total to $201,100 
– producing a predictable lifetime guarantee of 6 
percent on accumulated contributions. 
Prospective Guarantees
The past 83 years represent only a limited number of 
draws from an unlimited number of outcomes that 
could have occurred, and therefore cannot be used 
to determine the potential cost of guarantees going 
forward.  Instead, standard finance theory allows us 
to estimate the market price of future guarantees 
in a manner that reflects both the risk of insurers’ 
experiencing substantial shortfalls and their aversion 
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Figure 5. Guaranteed Account Balance Assuming
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Net price of 
collar
2% / 2%            0% $1.00    2.00%
2% / 3%      7.0   1.07 1.68
3% / 3%    24.1  1.24 2.00
3% / 4%    30.3  1.30 1.77
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A guaranteed minimum average rate of return on 
pension balances invested in stocks is a kind of put 
option, commonly known as a floor, which commits 
insurers to top up retirees’ pension accounts when 
their average returns fall short of the guaranteed 
return.  The price of a floor can be estimated assum-
ing that insurers’ aversion to risk matches the market 
average and that, in the future, equity returns follow 
a random walk with the same mean (7.6 percent) 
and standard deviation (19.5 percent) that they have 
displayed in the past.8  As shown in Table 3, this 
calculation indicates that the market price for guaran-
teeing a floor equal to the risk-free real rate of return, 
2 percent, amounts to 29 percent of a saver’s annual 
contributions (see the Appendix for details on calcula-
tions).9  In other words, for every dollar contributed to 
the savings plan, the participant would have to pay an 
additional 29 cents to the insurer.10   Buying a floor at 
a 3-percent rate of return comes at a higher price, 46 
percent of contributions.  As the floor increases, the 
price of the insurance jumps sharply.   
Savers can offset the cost of buying floors by sur-
rendering some of their upside returns to the insurer.  
This ceiling for average returns is a kind of call 
option, and the participant can sell this option to the 
insurer.  The insurer would then receive any returns 
that exceed the ceiling.  Unlike the price of floors, the 
price of a ceiling falls rapidly as the ceiling increases 
because higher ceilings reduce the potential gain to 
the insurer (see Table 3, column 2).  As a result, sav-
ers cannot expect to pay for generous floors by selling 
high ceilings.  
The combination of a floor and a ceiling is known 
as a collar.11   As shown in Table 3, the net price of a 
collar at the risk-free rate of return is zero – the cost 
of purchasing a floor is exactly covered by selling a 
ceiling.12  Collars at higher rates of return involve 
much higher net costs.  For example, a floor at 6 
percent combined with a ceiling at 6 percent would 
cost 150 percent of the contribution – that is, $1.50 for 
each $1 dollar contributed.  The net result – within 
this framework – is that the return on the combined 
insurance payment and contribution – the gross con-
tribution – never exceeds the riskless rate.  
If the participant is allowed some upside poten-
tial, say a floor of 2 percent and a ceiling of 3 percent, 
then the effective guarantee on the gross contribution 
must be less than the riskless rate (see Table 4).  In 
short, an individual who wants any upside potential 
must pay for it. 
The message from standard financial theory is 
that insurers cannot guarantee anything more than 
the riskless rate when they share the market’s aver-
sion to risk.13  On the other hand, at least historically, 
a riskless rate guarantee would have done nothing to 
smooth out fluctuations since no cohort would have 
received a lifetime return of less than 3.2 percent. 
This gap between past experience and finance the-
ory’s cap on feasible guarantees is due to limits on the 
market’s willingness and ability to bear risk.  This gap 
can be diminished if the government is less averse 
to risk than the market.  Indeed, citizens acting in 
concert through the government can impose arrange-
ments – such as intergenerational risk sharing – not 
possible by private agents acting on their own.  In ad-
dition, credit-worthy governments can access capital 
Table 3. Price of Guaranteed Floors and Ceilings 





Price of floor 
(1)
Price of ceiling 
(2)
Net cost for a 
collar
(3)=(1)-(2)
2 percent    29%    29%      0%
3 percent 46 22 24
4 percent 71 16 56
5 percent 107 11 97
6 percent 157 7 150
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markets at the risk-free rate of interest, provided their 
obligations are not excessive relative to their capacity 
to raise revenues now and in the future.14  Experience 
also suggests that the government is more willing 
and able to bear macroeconomic risk than the private 
market.  In its provision of unemployment insurance 
and its conduct of countercyclical fiscal policy, the 
government assumes commitments that appear too 
risky for private investors to provide.  One question, 
then, is whether government guarantees should be 
priced according to the risk aversion evident in capital 
markets, or should they be priced with less aversion 
to risk?   
Suppose, for example, the government’s level of 
risk aversion were only one half that of private insur-
ers. The price of a floor at the risk-free rate would be 
only 13 percent of contributions, less than half of its 
price using the market’s aversion to risk (see Table 5).  
More striking, by using collars, savers can purchase 
much higher guarantees at no, or little, net cost.  
For example, by purchasing a collar with a floor at 
a 4 percent rate of return and a ceiling at about 6 
percent, savers would, at no net cost, be guaranteed 
an average rate of return on their retirement savings 
in this range.15  The size of feasible guarantees, 
therefore, depends on the insurer’s degree of risk 
aversion.16 
Conclusion
This brief has been a speculative discussion of what 
might be involved if a new tier of retirement saving 
were introduced and if large variations in replace-
ment rates were viewed as unacceptable.  The only 
way to avoid wide variations in replacement rates is 
to provide a guarantee or some form of risk sharing. 
And, when a guarantee is the method chosen, the 
only way to eliminate most of the variation is for the 
guarantee to be relatively high.  Even though high 
guarantees would have been feasible historically, 
standard finance theory says that guaranteeing more 
than the riskless rate is impossible going forward.  
Finance theory also shows that the magnitude of fea-
sible guarantees depends critically on insurers’ ca-
pacity for bearing risk.  When the government is less 
averse to risk than other investors, it can guarantee 
rates of return higher than the riskless rate.  Conse-
quently, the feasibility of providing attractive guar-
antees for returns in a new tier of savings accounts 
depends on whether applying private insurers’ risk 
preferences to the government is appropriate.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 5. Price of Guaranteed Floors and Ceilings 




Price of floor 
(1)
Price of ceiling 
(2)
Net cost for a 
collar
(3)=(1)-(2)
2 percent     13%    97%     -84%
3 percent 23 83 -60
4 percent 40 68 -28
5 percent 66 53 13
6 percent 106 40 66
7 percent 165 28 137Endnotes
1 Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass (2008).
2 Munnell and Sundén (2006).
3 Munnell and Muldoon (2008).
4 Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass (2008).
5  A recent proposal would offer a guarantee with a 
real rate of return of 3 percent and allow a Board of 
Trustees to raise the guarantee if the economy per-
forms better than expected (Ghilarducci 2008).
6 Although we are unaware of any governments 
that directly offer defined contribution pension plan 
guarantees, both Germany and Switzerland require 
fund managers to guarantee some level of investment 
returns (see Ammann (2003) and Maurer and Schlag 
(2002), respectively). 
7 These balances assume that the individual began 
working in 1966 at a salary of $19,200 in 2008 dol-
lars, experienced annual wage growth of 2 percent, 
earning the reported average of $44,000 for those 
employed at 65.  The individual contributed 4 percent 
of salary each year, and received the return to U.S. 
equities each year.
8 This illustration could have used other distribu-
tions of returns, including distributions that specify 
some form of mean-reversion in returns or the price 
of equity.  Replacing the random walk assumed here 
with mean-reverting returns would tend to compress 
the range of payoffs for pension balances, thereby 
reducing the cost of floors on average.  However, if 
the reversion to mean is sufficiently slow, the poten-
tial cost of floors would be higher for participants who 
join the plan during years when returns are particu-
larly low compared to the floor for those who join 
when returns are particularly high.
9 This analysis uses the simplifying assumption that 
the risk-free rate is a fixed real two percent.  Lachance 
and Mitchell (2003) present a model in which the 
risk-free rate is a stochastic process.
10 Savers who purchase a floor at the risk-free rate 
can invest only $1 per $1.29 of contributions.  Conse-
quently, they are really guaranteeing only 78 percent 
of the retirement wealth that they could attain by 
investing each dollar of contribution in risk-free 
bonds.  Of course, their investment in equities offers 
an upside that risk-free bonds lack.  Savers who pur-
chase floors above the risk-free rate insure a higher 
rate of return, but their guaranteed minimum wealth 
in retirement falls as a result of the substantial cost of 
these floors. 
11 See Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001).
12 A collar at the risk-free rate fixes the return on 
stocks to match that on risk-free bonds.  No-arbitrage 
features in standard financial theory require that 
investments with identical payoffs be priced the same.   
Consequently, an investment in stocks combined 
with this collar has a return and yield equivalent to an 
investment in risk-free assets. 
13  The coefficient of relative risk aversion implied by 
the risk-free rate and distribution of returns on equity 
in this brief is 2.  This figure rests at the low end of 
the range reported in the literature, which tends to 
cluster between 2 and 10 depending in part on wheth-
er the estimates are derived from portfolio theory, 
purchases of insurance, economic experiments, or 
preferences over lotteries (Chetty 2003).  Three fac-
tors are important in considering the reasonableness 
of the implied level of risk aversion in this brief.  First, 
the 2 applies only to the marginal investor; infra-
marginal investors could well have higher levels of 
risk aversion.  Second, the market pricing of securi-
ties reflects the risk aversion of active institutional 
and professional investors, who are likely to be more 
willing and able to bear risk than the average inves-
tor.  And, third, the pricing of securities likely reflects 
the assessments of investors who are most optimistic 
about future returns, which tends to depress the coef-
ficient of risk aversion implied by market pricing.
14 Gollier (2008) shows that the ability of govern-
ments to enforce intergenerational risk sharing can 
increase the certainty equivalent rate of return by 
allowing pension funds to invest their financial assets 
more aggressively than would otherwise be optimal. 
15 When an insurer’s aversion to risk is less than that 
in the market, the insurer can capture a share of the 
market’s risk premium in the return on equity.  When 
the insurer is not averse to risk, it can offer the entire 
premium, at no extra cost, in guarantees of returns.  
Center for Retirement Research 8As a result, whereas market pricing does not allow 
guarantees in excess of the risk-free rate, an insurer 
with no aversion to risk could offer guarantees ap-
proaching 7.6 percent at no net cost.
16 A stable and responsible central government is 
likely less averse to risk than its households and busi-
nesses.  This brief finds that the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is about 2 for marginal private investors, 
given its assumptions about the risk-free rate and the 
distribution of the returns on equity.  Older public 
finance literature defended a low social discount rate 
on public investment, reflecting the government’s 
broad scope for diversifying risk and its risk-free cost 
of capital (Samuelson 1964; Vickery 1964; and Arrow 
1965, 1966), thereby implying a low coefficient of 
risk aversion in its pricing of investments from the 
viewpoint of the private market.  Some more recent 
work suggests discount rates for public investments 
that could exceed those of private investments (Jensen 
and Bailey 1972; and Bazelon and Smetters  1999).  
But, when the public investment covers the risk in the 
entire market portfolio averaged over long horizons, 
and the government can access capital, even in dif-
ficult times, at the risk-free rate, then the case for an 
effectively low coefficient of risk aversion for the gov-
ernment is more compelling.  This brief uses a value 
of 1 simply to illustrate the potential magnitude of the 
public benefit that the government might provide.
17 See Black and Scholes (1973).
18 See LaChance and Mitchell (2003).
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Center for Retirement Research 10APPENDIXRetrospective Guarantees – 
Tables 1 and 2
To compute when payments are required, we com-
pare two types of accounts at retirement: a guaranteed 
account and a non-guaranteed account.  In each case, 
workers are assumed to enter the labor force at age 
22, have earnings rise 2 percent a year, contribute 4 
percent of earnings into the account, and retire after 
43 years, at 65.  Each year, the guaranteed account 
earns the level of guarantee specified in the model.  
The non-guaranteed account earns the return experi-
enced by U.S. equities each year for the individual’s 
43-year worklife. 
      To calculate the values in Table 1, we determine 
whether the non-guaranteed account’s final balance 
falls short of the guaranteed account’s final balance.  
To calculate the amount of the payment, we need 
to determine the final wage of each cohort.  For the 
years after 1962, we use the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) to calculate the average wage for individuals at 
age 56 for that particular cohort.  (We use this pro-
cedure because a substantial segment of the age 65 
population does not receive a wage.)  We then project 
forward to age 65 using the model’s assumed annual 
growth rate of 2 percent.  Before 1962, we assume 
that the fraction of total wages earned by individuals 
aged 56 before 1962 equals the average fraction of 
total wages earned by individuals aged 56 after 1962.  
For each year before 1962, we divide this fraction of 
total wages by the total population of individuals age 
56 to find the average wage.  Again, because the CPS 
began in 1962, we must estimate the age 65 popula-
tion for all preceding years.  Age 65 populations are 
calculated using the weighted averages of forecasts 
and backcasts made from the Decennial Census re-
ports issued before and after the year in question, re-
spectively, and Social Security Administration cohort 
life tables.  (Note: all values are presented in chained 
year 2000 dollars).  Finally, this value is then divided 
by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each year in 
which a payment needed to be made on a guarantee.   
Table 2 is based on the values calculated for Table 1. 
      For column 1, we calculate the net gain or loss in 
each year as a percent of GDP.  We then take the aver-
age of those gains and losses over the entire 84-year 
period. For columns 2 and 3, we find the sum of the 
net losses as a percent of wages and GDP, respective-
ly, and divide by 84 – the total number of years. 
Prospective Guarantees – 
Tables 3, 4, and 5
The guarantee of a minimum return for a participant 
in a defined contribution pension plan is a kind of 
put option.  We value this option with Monte Carlo 
simulations instead of the Black-Scholes equation 
because the option’s payoff depends on the path taken 
by returns.17  The sequence of returns is critical when 
the option covers the average rate of return earned on 
a portfolio that receives annual contributions.18  
      For each of the 10,000 simulations, an individual 
makes a yearly contribution equal to a constant 
percent of his wages, the individual’s contribution is 
added to his assets and the balance earns a return.  
The terminal balance bT , will be equal to 
       
where c1 is the initial contribution, w is the assumed 
rate of wage growth,  and rt  is the return experienced 
in year t.  Returns were randomly generated as inde-
pendent and identically distributed normal variables 
with a mean of 7.6 percent and a standard deviation 
of 19.5 percent.   
      Each of the 10,000 terminal balances is sorted, 
arrayed, and assigned a probability of 1 in 10,000 to 
form the actual probability density function (PDF).  
The analysis examines guarantors whose aversion to 
risk matches that of the market (Table 3) and those 
who are less averse to risk (Table 5). 
      Assuming guarantors are averse to risk, we value 
the payoffs according to a constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function with a coefficient of risk 
aversion of 2.02.  The coefficient of risk aversion is 
consistent with investors’ requiring a 5.6 percent risk 
premium to hold a risky asset for 43 years with the 
normally distributed returns described above.  The 
risk-neutral PDF for these guarantors is the product 
of the actual PDF for terminal balances derived from 
the Monte Carlo simulations and the pricing kernel 
(the marginal utility of wealth divided by consump-
tion), which is then normalized to sum to one. 
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bT =      ct        (1+rj); ct = c1 (1+w)t-1         (1)
43
t = 1 j = t
43      The entries in Table 5 assume that guarantors 
are less averse to risk.  The risk-neutral PDF in this 
case is the product of the actual PDF and the pricing 
kernel derived from a CRRA utility function with a 
coefficient of risk aversion of 1.0.  
      To calculate the cost of a floor, we first use equa-
tion (1) to calculate the risk-free terminal wealth 
that would result from receiving the risk-free return 
each year.  We then use equation (1) to calculate the 
guaranteed terminal wealth that would result from 
receiving the guaranteed rate of return each year.  The 
cost of the floor is the present value of the expected 
value of terminal balances that are less than guaran-
teed terminal wealth.  The cost of the floor per dollar 
of contributions equals the conditional expectation 
of terminal balances that are less than guaranteed 
wealth divided by risk-free terminal wealth.  To calcu-
late this conditional expectation, the entries in Table 
3 use the risk-neutral PDF that incorporates a coef-
ficient of risk aversion of 2.02, while those in Table 
5 use the risk-neutral PDF that incorporates a coeffi-
cient of risk aversion of 1. 
      To calculate the cost of a ceiling, we use equa-
tion (1) to calculate the maximal terminal wealth that 
would result from receiving the ceiling rate of return 
each year.  The cost of the ceiling is the present value 
of the expected terminal balances that exceed maxi-
mal terminal wealth.  The cost of the ceiling per dollar 
of contributions equals the conditional expectation of 
terminal balances that exceed the maximal balance di-
vided by risk-free terminal wealth.  Again, the entries 
in Table 3 use the risk-neutral PDF that incorporates 
a coefficient of risk aversion of 2.02, while those in 
Table 5 use the risk-neutral PDF that incorporates a 
coefficient of risk aversion of 1.0
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